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This policy paper focuses on impacts of global and diffuse risks on the EU and its 
neighbourhood regions. It provides a brief overview of six major risk categories that cover 
majority of global and diffuse risks and suggests their prioritization based on temporality, 
probability of occurrence and multiplication effect. The empirical evidence dictates that, in 
order to better cope with the impacts of global and diffuse risks and strengthen the resilience 
of its neighbourhood countries and with extension - of itself, the EU needs to prioritize the 
global risks which not only endanger the EU and its surroundings in the long term (climate 
change) but can also act as major spoilers in the short term (irregular migration & geopolitical 
rivalries). Finally, the EU should also pay attention to multiple effects of global risks and 
devise strategies based on regional and country-specific differentiation.
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INTRODUCTION
Both in the East and in the South, the European Union (EU) is surrounded by neighbouring countries with 
serious security and stateness problems that manifest itself in two forms: areas of limited statehood 
(ALS) and Contested Orders (CO).  ALS are parts of a country in which the central authorities cannot 
enforce central rules and decisions or do not control the means of violence (Börzel and Risse 2018). ALS 
in EU’s neighbourhood mostly have a form of territorial conflicts (such as in Ukraine, Moldova, South 
Caucasus) or civil-war like conditions (Libya, Syria, Yemen, Iraq). Contested orders, on the other hand, 
refer to “incompatibilities between two or more competing views about how political, economic, social 
and territorial order should be established and/or sustained” (Börzel and Risse 2018: 12). Contested or-
ders emerge when legitimacy of existing institutions or governance norms are challenged by domestic 
(radicalized far-right and far-left movements, radical religious groups) and/or external (Russia, Iran, in-
ternational terrorist networks) actors.  It is important to note that the ALS and the CO are the permanent 
features of EU’s neighbourhood and do not per se threaten the EU’s security but under certain negative 
conditions either of them can deteriorate into governance breakdowns and violent conflicts and result in 
a significant security threat to the EU and its member states. These conditions may emerge as a result 
of a high exposure of EU’s neighbourhood regions to various global and diffuse risks. Therefore, it is of 
critical importance, to analyse the impacts of global and diffuse risks in EU’s neighbourhood and to iden-
tify under what conditions these risks contribute to violent conflicts and governance breakdowns. On the 
other hand, the Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) identified strengthening 
state and societal resilience in the neighbourhood countries as a main countervailing factor that can 
mitigate and deter those risks and prevent negative outcomes in EU’s neighbourhood (Eickhoff and Stol-
lenwerk 2018). Hence, to provide policy-relevant solutions for EU’s troubling neighbourhood, one needs 
to also connect global and diffuse risks and their impact on ALS and CO in EU’s neighbourhood with the 
resilience strengthening mechanisms. 
This policy paper focuses on the major impacts of the key global and diffuse risks in EU’s two neighbour-
hood regions – the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and the Eastern Partnership Area (EaP). It pro-
vides a fruitful starting point for thinking about measures to foster resilience and avoid that these risks 
turn into threats, thereby preventing governance breakdowns and/or violent conflicts in these areas. 
The paper provides recommendations for the EU on how to prioritize and classify the impacts global 
and diffuse risks in its neighbourhood regions. It also suggests which tipping points to watch that may 
exacerbate the impacts of global risks and result in governance breakdowns and/or violent conflicts. 
MAIN ARGUMENTS
GLOBAL AND DIFFUSE RISKS IN EU’S NEIGHBOURHOOD NEED DIFFERENTIATED 
POLICY ATTENTION
The EU-LISTCO project provides a comprehensive conceptualization and classification of global and 
diffuse risks. It sums up these risks under six broad categories: (1) Geopolitical rivalry and risks of 
major armed conflict; (2) Unconventional security risks; (3) Biological and environmental risks; (4) 
Demography and uncontrolled migration; (5) Global financial and other systemic economic risks, 
and; (6) Technology-driven disruption (Magen et al. 2019: 18). Whereas each of the six categories of 
























impact on ALS and CO in EU’s neighbourhood countries; hence need bigger policy attention from the 
EU in order to avoid negative spill over into the EU. Prioritizing of policy attention towards the global 
risks should occur along few important criteria including temporality, probability of occurrence and 
multiplication of impact.
WHICH RISKS SHOULD THE EU PRIORITIZE AND WHY?
In terms of temporality we can differentiate between short-term and long-term risks. From this perspec-
tive irregular migration is perhaps the most important global risk with a strongest short-term negative 
impact on the EU. New migration flows as a result of prolonged conflicts in EU’s neighbourhood may re-
sult in further strengthening of Eurosceptic and populist sentiments in the EU countries or in a re-nation-
alization of European politics and rollbacking of the European integration (Kaufmann 2018; Lehne 2018). 
Main developments that could generate new migration waves into the EU for the next few years are the 
infightings in the Northern Syria (province of Idlib), ongoing civil war in Libya or a new military escalation 
in Ukraine, but also a further deterioration of the EU-Turkey relations. What is more, accumulation of ir-
regular migration flows also undermines the governance capacity of affected EU neighbourhood states, 
such as Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon (Alshoubaki and Harris 2018; Berti 2015) and may result in new 
conflicts or governance crisis in these countries. Other global risks with short-term negative impacts in 
EU’s neighbourhood could also emanate from some aspects of cyber warfare (such as major attack on 
critical infrastructure or nuclear facility), or a quick escalation of geopolitical rivalries with involvement 
of hybrid tactics (e.g., assassination of Qassem Suleimani by US military), proxy wars or private mili-
tary companies (such as the 2018 direct clashes between US military and the Russian PMC Wagner in 
Northern Syria in 2018) (Hauer 2019). On the other hand, there are various global risks which could be 
more probable and have a more severe impact in the medium and long term but their impact exceeds 
the short time span. They include some environmental risks and some aspects of technology-driven 
disruption (such as automation of labour force or global competition over technological supremacy).
 
Regarding the probability of occurrence, some global and diffuse risks will continue to threaten the 
EU and its neighbourhood with a high degree of probability but different degrees of severity: climate 
change and environmental risks, some developmental aspects of technology-driven disruption such 
as workforce automation, irregular migration and refugee flows, and global geopolitical rivalries. Oth-
er risks, such as outbreak of diseases (such as recent Covid-19 epidemy) and unconventional (nu-
clear and/or cyber escalation) and some AI-driven risks, possess uncertain or unknown probability 
but, in case of occurrence, will have equally or more severe impacts for the security and stability of 
the EU and its neighbourhood. 
Finally, multiplication of impact refers to the observation that global and diffuse risks always act 
in tandem and multiply the effects of each other. For instance, climate exposure, environmental 
degradation, uncontrolled urbanization and population growth facilitate each other resulting in se-
vere competition over basic goods, hence opening a space for a potential violence or governance 
breakdown (Arsenault 2017; Baconi 2018; Baylouny and Klingseis 2018). In doing so, they “add an 
additional layer of stress that can increase state fragility and the likelihood of conflict” (McLeman 
2017: 105). Prominent examples of multiplication impact in EU’s neighbourhoods include conflict 
over allocation of water resources in Syrian Wadi Barada region, triggered by rapid urbanization 
and population growth in Damascus and government’s decision to divert the river water from 
Wadi Barada to the Syrian capital (Hiltermann 2016). Hence, a combination of uncontrolled urban-
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ization, fast population growth and environmental degradation in a form of water scarcity acted 
as a catalyst of the Arab Spring uprising in that area (Hiltermann 2016). Similarly, some authors 
draw connection between the 2010–2011 China drought, breakdown of global wheat supplies 
and price hikes for cereals in Egypt  which “influenced citizen protests, and indirectly led to regime 
change” (Lampietti et al. 2011). Therefore, overall it is hard to isolate the impacts of individual 
global risks on ALS and CO in the EU’s neighbourhood. What is needed instead, is to move beyond 
isolated analyses of individual risk factors towards exploring synergic effects of groups of risks 
in the EU’s neighbourhood.
GLOBAL RISKS, RESILIENCE AND GOVERNANCE CAPACITY
Impacts of global and diffuse risks and the policy solutions for their prevention and mitigation 
should be analysed in a combination with governance capacity and nature of state institutions 
of respective countries in EU’s neighbourhood regions. One significant observation is that there 
are inter- and intra-regional differences in EU’s neighbourhood in terms of governance capacity 
that requires more differentiated approach from the EU. Overall, it seems that due to better gover-
nance capacity (Fund for Peace 2019) some EaP states are better equipped to deal with the glob-
al and diffuse risks and also possess better capacities to develop some endogenous resilience 
measures with a targeted assistance of external actors. On the other hand, the MENA seems to 
be more fragmented region with few groups of states with very different degrees of governance 
capacity coexisting next to each other (Fund for Peace 2019). Whereas Israel, Morocco, Turkey 
and oil-rich Arab states do possess necessary amount of governance capacity to develop internal 
resilience against global and diffuse threats, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Iraq are widely considered 
as failed states (Fund for Peace 2019) with diminished capacity to tackle negative implications 
emanating from global and diffuse risks. The difference in governance quality and institutional 
design among the neighbourhood states should be translated into differential empowerment by 
the EU: The Union is advised to focus more on democratic components of societal resilience in 
countries that combine a better institutional capacity with a stronger civil society (Tunisia, Geor-
gia, Ukraine). On the other hand, in countries that are stuck in civil war and have no strong do-
mestic tradition of inclusive politics the primary focus should be on peace and institution building 
(Syria, Libya).  
DIRECT IMPACTS OF GLOBAL AND DIFFUSE RISKS 
Finally, it should also be mentioned that some of the global and diffuse risks also have a di-
rect negative impact on EU’s security and stability, hence bypassing EU’s neighbourhood regions. 
These risks include, for instance, hybrid and cyber warfare tactics utilized often by Russia and 
China (stretching from the interference in elections of EU member states to industrial espionage 
and takeover of high-tech companies by Chinese state-backed corporations). The US unpredict-
able foreign policy under Donald Trump, which questions the US commitment to NATO and backs 
up Brexit, for example, threatens the basics of EU’s security and stability. Other direct global risks 
may include nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, the outbreak of diseases and global pandem-
ics (such as recent outbreak of coronavirus in China) and economic consequences of Brexit (Ries 
et al. 2017) or an outbreak of a new major financial and economic crisis. Hence, when discussing 
the impacts of global and diffuse risks it is noteworthy to remember that often they can bypass 

























CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. REGIONAL AND COUNTRY-SPECIFIC DIFFERENTIATION OF GLOBAL AND DIFFUSE 
RISKS NEEDED
For a long time, the EU instinctively tended towards a one-size-fits-all approach in its neighbourhood 
governance. Yet, the two neighbourhoods of the EU (the MENA and the EaP) as well as individual 
countries within the two groups differ significantly from each other, both in terms of their exposure to 
the global and diffuse risks, and the degree of governance capacity they possess to develop internal 
resilience against the risks.  Therefore, the EU needs to develop more differentiated approach which 
will consider both inter- and intra-regional differences. For instance, in Libya, Syria and Yemen the 
ending of conflict and rebuilding of peace process should be a key objective of the EU whereas in 
Tunisia, Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine – countries with more stable political systems and pluralist 
traditions - democracy promotion and support for civil society should also be an integral part of any 
resilience-promoting initiative.
2. PAY ATTENTION TO MULTIPLICATION EFFECTS OF GLOBAL AND DIFFUSE RISKS
Global and diffuse risks do not act in isolation but have multiplying impact on the effects of each 
other. For instance, in many countries of the Middle East and North Africa, climate variability, environ-
mental degradation, water scarcity and irregular migration interact with each other in the way that it 
produces new conflict lines or exacerbates the existing ones. Similarly, geopolitical rivalries coupled 
with hybrid warfare tactics produce fruitful soil for quick escalation of violence. Therefore, when de-
vising measures to strengthen resilience of neighbourhood countries the EU needs to consider how 
to tackle synergic negative impacts of more than one global and diffuse risk. 
3. DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN SHORT- AND LONG-TERM IMPACTS OF GLOBAL AND 
DIFFUSE RISKS
Some of the significant global risks, such as climate change and environmental degradation, may 
have detrimental medium- and long-term results for the EU and its neighbourhood. However, short-
term risks may cause even bigger threat to EU’s security and stability. For instance, new waves of 
irregular migration may further embolden Eurosceptic forces across Europe, making EU policies in-
cluding the green agenda reversible. Therefore, whereas the climate change should remain the main 
priority, the EU should also pay a prior attention to tackling short-term risks which possess a high 
spoiler potential in the short run. For instance, the EU should focus on regulating irregular migration, 
both by consolidating and harmonizing migration policies inside the EU, and devising policies to as-
sist the affected neighborhood countries. 
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